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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILcox
JURISDICTION, Q. S.
Commonwealth v. Kaiser, 24 D. R. (Pa.) 74. Bigamy--Power to Declare
Bigamous Marriage Void as Incident of Sentence (Act of March 27, 1903).
"The conviction of a defendant of bigamy under the Act of March 27, 1903,
P. L. 102, establishes the fact of the bigamous marriage, and the Court of Quar-
ter Sessions in imposing sentence on the defendant may, as an incident to the
sentence, declare the bigamous marriage null and void.
"It is not the decree that renders the marriage a nullity. The Act of As-
sembly itself declares that the marriage shall be void. The only function of the
decree is to render the fact of nullity judicially certain. * * *
"The verdict of the jury in the present case establishes the fact of the
bigamous marriage, and the Court of Quarter Sessions, in imposing sentence
on the defendant, has authority to declare the bigamous marriage null and
void (Commonwealth v. Walhski, 18 Dist. R., 504). The fact of a bigamous
marriage may be established either in a proceeding in the Common Pleas under
the provisions of the Act of April 14, 1859, P. L. 647, or upon an indictment in
the Quarter Sessions, and in either case the court having jurisdiction may ad-judge the bigamous marriage void. The Act of March 27, 1903, P. L. 102, espe-
cially declares that a bigamous mfirriage shall be void, and there is no valid
reason why the Court of Quarter Sessions may not enter an adjudication thereof
as an indictment to the sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of bigamy
under the act. It is not the decree that renders the marriage a nullity. The
only function of the decree is to render the fact of nullity judicially certain
(Newlh's Estate, 231 Pa., 312)."
It is interesting to note in connection with the problem of permitting a
criminal court to enter judgment in civil matters as shown by articles in almost
every part of II Progresso del Diritto Criminale that Judge Van Swearingen
entered a civil judgment in a criminal procedure. JOHN LISLE.
STATUTORY RAPE
Misconduct of Jury. I call your attention to the case of State of Kansas
v. Charles P. Warner, 93 Kansas, 378, decided November 14, 1914, as a good-
example of the way that Kansas' Supreme Court avoids undoing all the work
of a trial court in a criminal case in order to correct an error less than the
whole. Warner was convicted in Clay County District Court of statutory rape
(as the term is commonly used for illicit sexual relations with a female person
under the age of legal consent, as distinguished from forcible ravishment).
Upon motion for new trial, among other points presented was the question of
misconduct of the jury which was alleged to have discussed and considered
why the defendant did not take the stand in his own hehalf. The trial court
refused to permit testimony to this end. The Supreme Court after examining
all specifications of error, concluded that none appeared, but that the trial
court shall have heard and considered testimony as to the alleged miscon-
duct of the jury. It therefore directed the case remanded for reconJdera-
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tion by the trial court of the question of misconduct, but in all other respects
sustained the lower court, the jury's verdict and the court's sentence. In
the syllabus, which in Kansas is the law of the case, the court said: "Where
a verdict of guilty is rendered without any materially erroneous ruling hav-
ing been made by the court, but upon a motion for a new trial competent evi-
dence upon a question of misconduct of the jury is erroneously rejected, it is
not necessary that a new trial of the guilt or innocence of the defendant
should be ordered by this court, but the cause may be remanded with direc-
tions that the proceedings shall be resumed at the point where the error was
committed." In the opinion the court said: "We do not decide that any of
the jurors were guilty of misconduct, but merely that the defendant has not
had a full hearing upon the question whether or not such was the case. This
error can be corrected by placing the matter before the District Court in the
same condition as when the ruling was made, so that it may be corrected,
and further proceedings taken according to the result then reached. (See
State v. Tyree, 70 Kansas 203, 207.) The sentence wil be set aside, and the
cause remanded with directions for the court to investigate the question of the
alleged misconduct of the jury, in the light of all available competent evidence,
and pronounce judgment or grant a new trial according to the decision that
shall be reached in this matter."
TESTIMONY.
Incompetency of Husband and Wife. The Supreme Court of Kansas, at
its December session, came out squarely, though foreshadowing a similar
course heretofore, and decided that the provisions of the civil code as to the
incompetency of husband or wife to testify against the other do not apply in
criminal cases, and that the provision of the criminal code, Section 215, which
says that no one shall be rendered incompetent to testify in a criminal case by
reason of being the husband or wife of the accused, removes the only objec-
tion to the admissibility of such evidence.
JUDGE J. C. RUPPENTHAi, Russell, Kan.
ABATEMENT OF HOUSES OF ILL-FAME.
State v Gilbert, Minn., 147 N. W. 953. Right to Jury Trial. A statute
authorized proceedings in an equity court to enjoin the maintenance of houses
of all-fame. Personal property therein was to be sold and the proceeds paid to
the county treasurer except where the owner proved innocence of knowledge
that it had been used in violation of the statute. The house was to be closed
for one year. "A penalty of $300" was to be imposed "as a tax upon the
property and against the person" of the owner or agent which should be a lien
upon the land. It was objected that these provisions were penal, so that the
legislature could not dispense with trial by jury, by giving equity jurisdiction to
enforce them. Held that independently of the statute equity has jurisdiction
to abate nuisances, and the legislature has power to enlarge that jurisdiction.
The purpose of the act is clearly "repression of the evil, to be worked out by
equitable attack upon the property of those engaged in or abetting it and not
punishment of" the offenders by tlae infliction of a personal penalty," hence is
is a proceeding to abate a nuisance and not to punish a crime. While the act
speaks of the imposition of a "penalty" of $300, the contest clearly indicates
that it is treated as a tax. Such a tax may be legally imposed as a deterrent
without being technical penalty. Hence the statute is constitutional and the
defendant not entitled to a jury trial.
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BIBERY.
People v. Peters, Ill., 106 N. E. 513. Necessity of Acceptance of Bribe for
Completed Offense. Under Crim. Code Sec. 31, declaring that whoever gives
any money or other bribe to any state's attorney, with intent to influence his
action on any matter which may be brought before him in his official capacity,
or to exercise his powirs otherwise than as required by law, shall be guilty of
bribery, and in view of Sec. 32, imposing a fine upon'any one attempting to
bribe any state's attorney as set out in the preceding section, the giving and
the receiving of the bribe with corrupt intent are essential to the offense of
bribery; and hence where the state's attorney took an offered bribe without
corrupt intent and in order to convict the party receiving it, there was no ac-
ceptance, and hence the offender was not guilty of the offense of bribery.
BRIEFS.
People v Willett, 149 N. Y. Supp. 348. Improper Language. Where the
district attorney's brief on appeal, in a criminal case, characterized the con-
duct of the justice of the Supreme Court, who granted a certificate of reason-
able doubt as "intellectual inertia," "unmitigated unthinking," and "plain
blundering," followed by expressions which could only be interpreted as
charging judicial insincerity and duplicity, the language was contemptuous,
and the brief should be stricken from the files. JENKs, P. J., Dissenting.
BURGLARY.
Lawson v. Coin., Ky. App., 169 S. W. 587. Breaking Out. The defendant
was indicted and convicted under a statute providing for punishment "If any
person * * * shall feloniously break any dwelling house and feloniously take
away anything of value * * *." Another section provided that statutes in der-
ogation of the common law should be liberally construed with a view to pro-
mote their operation. The evidence indicated that the defendant enterd a
dwelling house through a window, stole flour and lard, unfastened the rear
door of the house and carried the stolen goods out through that door, re-entered
the house, fastened the rear door and left the house through the open window.
The defendant appealed on the ground that the court erred in refusing to direct
and acquittal because the proof failed to show the accused had broken into the
house. Held that the opening of the rear door was a breaking. The statute
did not require that the breaking precede the theft. The defendant had stolen
the goods and broken out of the house. Hence the court did not err in refusing
to direct an acquittal.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Commonwealth v Karvonen, Mass. 106 N. E. 556. Validity of Statute
Forbidding Use of Red Flags in Parades. As a "red flag" is well recognized
as a revolutionary and terroristic emblem, Stat. 1913, c. 678, sec. 2, prohibiting
the carrying of red or black flags in parade, is not bad as unlawfully depriving
persons of their liberty: the purpose of the enactment being to prevent parades
which would provoke turbulence, which is a legitimate regulation of personal
liberty.
CRIMINAL PRocEss AGAINST CORPORATION.
State v. Taylor, S. Dak., 147 N. W. 72. Summons. A code of criminal
procedure provided for the issuance of summons to bring a corporation before
a magistrate for preliminary hearing upon a criminal charge, but contained no
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provision for process against a corporation upon an indictment or information.
It provided that in matters not covered by the code the practice should be in
accordance with the common law. The penal code applied to corporations as
well as to natural persons. A corporation was indicted, and a writ of summons
issued." On the return day it appeared specially and objected to further pro-
ceedings on the ground that the statute did not authorize the issuance of a
summons upon the indictment and hence the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendant. Held that the maxim "expressio unius, exclusio alterius" does not
apply as the legislature has wholly failed to provide a method of bringing a
corporation into court for trial upon an indictment or information. The com-
mon law process by distringas being obsolete, service of summons was valid
to require the corporation to answer the indictment and the court thereby
acquired jurisdiction of the defendant. People v Equitable Gas Light Com-
pany, 5 N. Y. Supp., which held the other way, was overruled.
DRUNKENNESS.
United States v LeClair. Criminal Cause 100, United States Court for
China. Nov. 2, 1914. Effect of Voluntary Use of Cocaine. By the prevailing
rule mental aberration, produced by the voluntary use of cocaine is treated as
affecting criminal responsibility in the same way as that resulting from the
similar use of intoxicating liquors, i. e., the crime committed under such cir-
cumstances is not excused, but it is classified as of lower degree and the pun-
ishment is reduced accordingly.
ERRoR WiTHouT PREJUDICE.
Raoul v City of Atlanta, Ga. App., 82 S. E. 763. Guilt Admitted. De-
fendant was convicted in the recorder's court of selling liquor illegally. He
applied to the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari, which was refused, and
he brought error. At the trial he admitted that he was secretary and treasurer
of the Owls' Club, that the club sold liquor illegally, and that he received as
compensation for his services to the club ten per cent of all its receipts, includ-
ing those from such sales. He denied that he bought the liquor kept at the
club or that he ever made any sales. Held that on his own statement he was
an accessory to the violation of the ordinance, so the certiorari should not
have been issued even though illegal evidence was admitted against him at the
trial and other errors committed by the recorder. "If the only possible legal
result has been reached, the judgment of the trial judge will not be reversed
for the purpose of allowing the case to be heard again, that the same result
may be brought about more technically."
EviNCmE
State v. Lasecki, Ohio, 106 N. E. 660. Res Gestae. The exclamation of a
boy, four years of age that "the bums killed pa with a broomstick," 'which was
made from 10 to 30 seconds after a fatal assault upon his father, made in the
boy's presence, is competent evidence to go to the jury as explanatory and
illustrative of the manner and means by which the father was assaulted. The
utterance of the boy under such circumstances, made at the earliest opportun-
ity to make an outcry in the presence and hearing of others, was the spon-
taneous and impulsive language of the situation, free from any subterfuge,
artifice or motive to fabricate. Its weight, however, is purely a question for
the jury.
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People v. Walter,-149 N. Y. Supp. 365. Effect of Stipulation by Joint
Defendants. Where defendant and C. were jointly tried with their consent
for an offense against the franchise, and at the beginning of the trial it
was stipulated that all testimony offered in behalf of either defendant and
received without objection should inure to the benefit of both, the converse
was equally true, and hence, where a witness gave certain testimony that
created an inference favorable to C., proof in rebuttal that such testimony
was false, and showing that the fact tended to an incriminatory inference,
was admissible against accused as well. Jenks, P. J., and Carr, J., dissenting.
FALSE PRETENSES.
State v. Foxton, Ia., 147 N. W. 347. Drawing Check Without Funds.
The defendant was convicted of cheating by false pretense. He asked a
friend to identify him at a bank where the friend lived so that it would
cash a check on his home bank. The friend introduced him to the assistant
cashier, who asked if the friend would endorse the check. Defendant then
drew a check upon his home bank, payable to the friend's order. The friend
endorsed it and the bank, at which they then were, paid the defendant the
cash in the friend's presence. The defendant did not say whether he had
money in the bank on which the check was drawn or whether the check would
be paid on presentation. The check was dishonored and the friend was forced
to repay the amount to the bank. The defendant never had any money in his
home bank on which he had a right to draw checks and had no reason to
believe that the check would be paid by that bank. After defendant was
arrested he repaid the amount of the check to the friend. Held that the
mere making and delivery of the check, to induce the payment of the money,
is an assertion and pretense that the drawer has, at the time, money or credit
at the bank on which the check is drawn and that the check will be paid upon
presentation. Hence the defendant obtained the money from his friend by
a false pretense.
FoPFEITuRE OF PROPERTY USED ILLEGALLY.
State v. Gilbert, Minn., 147 N. W. 953. Due Process of Law. A statute
giving courts of equity jurisdiction to abate houses of ill-fame, directs the
removal of all movable personal property and the sale of such as belongs to
defendants notified or appearing in the suit, unless the owners appear and
claim the same within ten days after the order of abatement is made and
prove to the satisfaction of the court their innocence of knowledge of said
use and of their inability to have acquired such knowledge by reasonable care
and diligence; every defendant being presumed to have known the general
reports of the place. If their innocence is thus established, the property shall
be delivered to them, but otherwise sold. Held that as the statute prescribes
notice to everyone and makes provision for a full hearing before final judg-
ment upon the matters involved, it does not authorize property to be taken
without due process of law. The provisions making lack of reasonable care
or diligence equivalent to notice of the use to which the property is being put
is valid, for ignorance due to neglect is the equivalent of notice. Hence the
provision is constitutional.
FORMsER JEOPARDY.
People ex rel. Bullock v. Warden of City Prison, 150 N. Y. Supp. 24.
Use of Writ of Habeas Corpus in Place of Plea of Former Jeopardy. Where
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relator was indicted for manslaughter, and the jury disagreed, the Supreme
Court will not, where the prosecution for manslaughter was dismissed and
relator reindicted for murder in the first degree, liberate him on habeas corpus,
even though his first trial constituted former jeopardy, and a conviction for
murder in the first degree could not be upheld, for it must be presumed that
the County Court, which has jurisdiction of the proceedings, will grant relator
proper relief. Relator's first trial constituted former jeopardy, within the
Federal and State Constitutions, prohibiting the putting of a person in jeopardy
twice for the same offense; for the state having proceeded to trial and re-
quired the defendant to make his defense against a charge of one degree of
homocide, cannot thereafter dismiss that prosecution ind indict for a higher
degree, even though, under Code Cr. Proc., Sec. 400, authorizing the trial
judge to dismiss the charge and order a resubmission of the case to the grand
jury, where the testimony shows a higher offense than that charged, it might
have secured a dismissal and reindictment before accused had made his defense.
HIGHWAYS.
Southern Ry. Co. v. State, Tenn., 169 S. W. 1173. Obstruction Caused by
Change of Grade. In 1887 a railroad trestle was lawfully built over a public
highway. It did not obstruct travel. The town in which it was located was
incorporated in 1903, and some time thereafter it raised the grade of the
road under the trestle about two or two and one-half feet. In consequence,
loads of hay, fodder, and vehicles similarly loaded could not pass under the
trestle. Defendant then owned the trestle. The town did not order de-
fendant to raise it. Defendant was indicted and convicted of obstructing a
public road. The court said that the town had power to change the grade
of the street, and could have required the railroad company to reconstruct its
crossing to conform to the change, but held that as no such order had been
made the railroad company was not criminally liable because of the obstruc-
tion. When one's property is, by the act of other parties over whom he has
no control, made the instrumentality of a nuisance, the act of those parties is
the proximate cause, and the innocent owner of the property is not respon-
sible. It would seem to follow from the argument that the town and its offi-
cers might be criminally liable for failure to have the obstruction removed.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.
Coleman v. Com., Ky. App., 169 S. V. 595. Change of Law. The inde-
terminate sentence law of 1910 provided that upon conviction of felony the
court should sentence the defendant, fixing as the minimum and maximum
limits of the term the corresponding limits provided by the statutes. In 1914
this law was changed, the new act providing that the jury should render a
verdict fixing an indefinite term, the minimum of which should not be less
and the maximum not greater than the minimum and maximum punishment
prescribed by the statute. After the second act took effect, the defendant
was tried and convicted for a crime committed in 1913, and was sentenced by
the court in accordance with the act of 1910. The defendant appealed on the
ground that the length of the term of imprisonment should have been fixed
by the jury as provided by the act of 1914, under a statute providing that if
any punishment be mitigated by a provision of a new law, such a provision
may by the consent of the party affected be applied to any judgment pro-
nounced after the, new law takes effect. Held that, under the act of 1910,
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
the prisoner would have the right of applying for a discharge when he had
served the minimum term prescribed by the statute. Under the act of 1914,
the jury could fix no shorter term, while it could fix a longer minimum. Thus
the act of 1914 did not certainly mitigate the punishment. Furthermore, the
act of 1914 did not apply unless the defendanf consented on the record to have
the punishment fixed under it, and he had not done so. Hence the trial court
was correct in imposing sentence under the act of 1910. The conviction was
affirmed.
Woods v. State, Tenn., 169 S. W. 558. Constitutionality. Under the stat-
utes of Tennessee prior to the enactment of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the jury, when they convicted, fixed the length of the term of imprison-
ment. Under the new law the judge imposed sentence that the term be not
less than the minimum nor more than the maximum terms provided by the
statute under which the conviction was had. The defendant was convicted of
a crime committed after the new law took effect, but the verdict of the jury
fixed his term of imprisonment-at five years. The judge disregarded the term
prescribed by the jury and sentenced the defendant to not less than three nor
more than ten years in the penitentiary, pursuant to the statutes. The defend-
ant appealed on the ground that the new law was unconstitutional. Held (1)
that the act does not impair the right of trial by jury, as the right to have
the jury assess the punishment was not a part of the right of trial by
jury at common law. (2) It does not deprive defendant of liberty without
due process of law, as the law is 'general, applying to a definite and reasonable
class of cases, and it deprives no man of his liberty unless he has been duly
found guilty by the verdict of a jury. (3) It does not confer judicial powers
upon administrative officers, in violation of the constitutional provision keep-
ing the legislative, judicial and executive departments distinct. The power
conferred upon the board of prison commissioners to grant a parole after the
expiration of the minimum term fixed by law is discretionary, but the exer-
cise of discretion is not restricted to judicial officers ; many administrative
officers exercise discretion. There is no litigation between parties to be de-
cided by the commissioners; their decision deprives no one of any legal right,
nor does it transfer any property or right from one person to another. Fur-
ther, their discretion is not unlimited, but the legislature doubtless intended
that it should be controlled by the same principles as were laid down in the
act as conditions for final discharge. The parole leaves the prisoner in the
custody of the board, and subject to reimprisonment on its order. (4) It does
not delegate legislative authority. The statute under which the conviction is
had fixes the maximum term of imprisonment, subject to diminution at the
discretion of the board, after the minimum term prescribed by that statute
shall have been served. This is no more a legislative act than was the verdict
of the jury which, under the prior statute, fixed the length of the term. It is
much like the discretion given to prison officials under good-time statutes to
decide whether the prisoner's conduct has entitled him to the full reduction of
time for good conduct. It is now generally agreed that reformation is the
object of imprisonment. This can be accomplished only by restraint, observa-
tion, guidance, and protection from imposition. Neither the courts, the legis-
lature nor the governor could exercise the necessary authority. The powers
are neither judicial, legislative, nor executive in the sense in which those terms
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
are used in constitutional limitations, but they "belong to that great residuum
of governmental authority, the police power, to be made effective, as is often
the case, through administrative agencies." (5) It does not trench upon the
governor's pardoning power. When the board is satisfied that a paroled
prisoner has become law-abiding, it may recommend his discharge to the
governor, who may then discharge him. This is not a pardon, as the rights
of citizenship are not thereby restored. Hence the judgment of the trial
court was affirmed.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
Lee v. State, Ark., 169 S. W. 963. Variance in Unnecessary Description.
The defendant was convicted under an indictment which charged that she
enticed a female under the age of sixteen years to become an inmate of a house
of prostitution, "Said home then and there being situated on Lake Street, in
the city of Paragould, Green County, Arkansas." The proof was that the
house was not on Lake Street, but upon a short street in that vicinity. Held
that the offense was of a local character. The indictment would have been
sufficient had it charged only that the house was in Paragould. But since the
pleader alleged the location upon a particular street, that allegation became
descriptive of the offense, and material, and should have been proved as
charged. Hence the variance was fatal, the judgment was reversed, and the
case remanded for a new trial.
Timmons v. State, Ga. App., 82 S. E. 378. Variance. An indictment for
stealing a cow stated the color of the cow. At the trial the witnesses disagreed
as to her color, but there was some evidence that substantially conformed to
the description in the indictment. The defendant was convicted. Held that
as the jury could believe the witnesses whose testimony agreed with- the de-
scription in the indictment, and disbelieve the others, there was no fatal
variance between the allegation and the proof. The conviction was affirmed.
Rutherford v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 169 S. W. 1157. Clerical Error. De-
fendant was convicted of pursuing the occupation of itinerant physician with-
out having paid the statutory tax. The indictment as found by the grand
jury charged that defendant pursued the occupation of "physicial." Defendant
moved to quash, on the ground that no such occupation as "physicial" was taxed.
The trial court ordered the clerk to change the "T to "n," and denied the
motion to quastr. Held error. The word was a matter of substance in the
offense charged and not a mere matter of form. An indictment cannot be
amended in matter of substance. "Had the trial court not undertaken to
change the wording of the indictment, the whole context might have been
sufficient, notwithstanding this mistake in spelling the word "physician," but
we cannot countenance the alteration of indictments in matters of substance
after they have been returned into court." The judgment was reversed and
the prosecution ordered dismissed.
State v. Foxton, Ia., 147 N. W. 347. Amendment. A statute provided
that the county attorney might before or during the trial amend the indict-
ment to correct errors as to matters of form, or in the name of any person,
or the description of any person or thing, or in the allegation concerning the
ownership of property; but such amendment should not prejudice the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant or charge him with a different crime or a
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different degree of crime than that already charged. The indictment charged
that by a specified false pretense the defendant induced one Dickinson "by
said false and fraudulent practices and representations to part with and pay
to the defendant $50.00, and accept from the defendant his check therefor."
During the trial the court permitted the county attorney to amend the indict-
ment by changing the final period to a comma and adding "by endorsing de-
fendant's check and procuring money thereon from the State Bank of Waverly,
Iowa, which was thereupon paid to the defendant." Held the amendment
simply stated the manner in which the money was paid to the defendant, as
charged in the original indictment. It did not change the nature or degree of
the crime nor prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Hence it was
not error to permit the amendment to be made.
INSANITY.
Commonwealth v. Cooper, Mass., 106 N. E. 545. Improper Instruction.
In a prosecution for murder, a charge that if defendant had a mental dis-
order called "constitutional inferiority," and that if the jury find that such
disorder carried with it a limited-that is, diminished-degree of responsibility
for the act, he could not be found guilty of murder in the first degree, was
properly refused, since the defendant, even if abnormally deficient in will
power and of retarded mental development, might still be found to have been
fully conscious of the criminal character and consequences of his act.
LARcENY.
Morton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 166 S. W. 974. By Trustee. The
defendant was convicted of grand larceny on an indictment charging that he
had "* * * taken, stolen, and carried away from the possession of Eliza-
beth Shelton $525.00 of good and lawful money * * * and one land note
of $675.00, * * * the personal property of said Elizabeth Shelton * * *
with the felonious intent to convert the same to his own use and to perma-
nently deprive the owner, Elizabeth Shelton, of the same." The proof was
that the defendant came from Tennessee and soon became engaged to Miss
Shelton. He insisted that she sell her farm in Kentucky, as they would return
to live on a farm he claimed to own in Tennessee, and said if she would
convey the land to him he could get $200.00 more tharr she -could sell it for
and he would at once turn over the proceeds to her. Relying on this advice,
she conveyed the farm to him, without consideration, though the deed recited
a pretended consideration of $1,100.00. The next day he sold and conveyed
the farm for $1,200.00, receiving $525.00 in cash and a note payable to himself
for $675.00. He kept both the cash and the note, and tried to sell the latter.
He appealed from the conviction on the ground that this evidence did not
show grand larceny, but obtaining money and property by false pretenses.
Held that the evidence showed that the defendant obtained the deed with- the
felonious intent to steal and convert the proceeds of the land to his own use.
"The several transactions by which this object was accomplished were but
part of the trick or device by which- she was deprived of the consideration re-
ceived by appellant from the sale of the land and its conversion effected by
him." Relying upon the fraudulent representations, Miss Shelton constituted
defendant "her agent to sell the land and immediately pay over to her the pro-
ceeds." When he received and converted the proceeds he committed grand
larceny. "* * * This arrangement having been brought about by his fraudu-
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lent procurement and with the felonious intent on his part to steal, carry away
and convert to his own use the money and note received by him from the
land, he should not be allowed to escape the punishment that will result to
him from the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, upon
the false and purely technical ground that he is guilty of a felony other than
the one for which he was indicted and convicted. It is evident that under the
conveyance the defendant held the land as trustee for Miss Shelton, and when
he sold and conveyed the land, as he was authorized to do, the proceeds were
a trust fund in his hands for her benefit. She never had legal title to, nor pos-
session of, the proceeds. If there is a statute in Kentucky which makes a
trustee, who embezzles the trust fund, guilty of grand larceny, the decision is
evidently correct. The case does not indicate that there is any such statute.
The court evidently treats it as a case of larceny by trick at common law.
But it is novel doctrine at common law that property can be stolen from a
person who neither owns nor possesses it. The court was doubtless con-
fused by the contention of the defense that the money and note were obtained
by false pretenses, which was equally unsound, as no false pretenses were
made to the person from whom the money and note were obtained. The last
extract quoted from the opinion of the court seems to go beyond the farthest
demands of those advocating the reform of our criminal procedure by elimi-
nating technicalities. The.conclusion seems to be that since the defendant
has been convicted of one crime, and as the evidence shows he committed
some crime, the conviction should be affirmed. No one could reasonably ask
greater freedom from technicalities than this.
State v. Beard, S. Dak., 147 N. W. 69. Proof of the Corpus Delicti. The
defendant was convicted of stealing a horse. The evidence showed that the
horse had been in the owner's possession in October, 1912, had .not been sold
to the defendant nor to anyone else, that no one had been given authority to
take and dispose of it, and that it was found in the possession of this defendant
in March, 1913. There was no evidence as to the whereabouts of the horse
between those dates or as to how it came into the defendant's possession.
Held that the evidence did not show a felonious taking by anyone, so that
the presumption of guilt arising from the recent possession of stolen property
did not arise. Because the corpus delicto was not proven, the conviction
was reversed.
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.
Commonwealth v. Southern Express Co., Ky. App., 169 S. W. 517. Re-
moving Written Evidence from the Jurisdiction. An indictment charged that
the grand jury being about to investigate violations of the prohibitory law,
the defendant, knowing that certain of its books and papers contained evi-
dence of the violation of the law by itself and others, and knowing that such
books and papers would be called for and required by the grand jury, caused
them to be removed from the county, for the purpose of hindering, obstructing,
and preventing such investigation; and thereby obstructing justice. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to the indictment and discharged the defendant.
The commonwealth appealed. The Appellate Court said that a natural per-
son could not be required to exhibit to the grand jury the contents of his
books and papers containing evidence incriminating himself, any more than
he could be required to incriminate himself by word of mouth, but when sub-
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poenaed to produce them he must appear in person before the court with the
required evidence in his possession and must tender himself and his books
and papers for investigation by the court, so that it may determine for itself
whether the evidence desired is of an incriminating nature. But it held that
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination does not extend to cor-
porations and may not be claimed for it by its officers or agents. The de-
fendant could have been compelled to produce its books and papers, by the
subpcena duces tecum ad testificandum, directed to the agent of the cor-
poration, for possession of the records, or by a subpcena duces tecum with-
out the testificanduin clause directed to the corporation itself and served upon
its personal agent. It was immaterial that, when the records were removed,
no subpcena had been issued requiring the company to produce them before
the grand jury. Records cannot be removed with impunity in anticipation of a
subpcena any more than a possible witness can be bribed or intimidated from
attending the trial before a subpcena has been served upon him. Hence the
removal of the records constituted an obstruction of justice and the judgment
of the lower court was reversed.
PARTIES.
United States v. LeClair, Criminal Cause No. 100, U. S. Court for China,
Nov. 2, 1914. Principals in the Second Degree under the New Federal Penal
Code. The common law classification of principals into those of the first and
second degrees has not been abolished by the Federal Penal Code, and where
defendant was not the actual perpetrator of the abstraction which constitutes
the gist of a robbery he must be treated as a principal in the second degree.
People v. Bruno, 149 N. Y. Supp. 321. Accomplice. Penal Law Sec. 2354,
subd. 1, providing that a person who counterfeits a trade-mark shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, implies that the act shall be done with a fraudulent or
criminal intent, and a printer, by printing impressions from plates brought to
him by his customer in the ordinary course of business, and delivering the im-
pressions to his customer, could not be regarded as an accomplice, within the
law relating to the evidence of accomplices.
People v. Kiminel et al., 150 N. Y. Supp. 311. Liability of Partnership for
Unauthorized Act of Agent in Selling Adulterated Drugs. Under Public
Health Law, Sec. 234, as amended by Laws 1910, Ch. 422, making every pro-
prietor of a pharmacy or drug store responsible for the strength, quality and
purity of all drugs sold or disposed by him; Sec. 235, as so amended, mak-
ing a proprietor liable for violations of that section by his apprentices or un-
licensed employees; Sec. 240, subd. 10 and 11, as so amended, making it a
misdemeanor for any person to adulterate any drug, knowing or intending
that it shall be used, or to sell any adulterated drug, or for any person to
violate any provision of that article for which no punishment is imposed;
and the further provision of Sec. 240, as amended, that any person violating
any provision of that article who is not criminally prosecuted shall forfeit to
the people $50.00, that the word "person" in that article shall import both
the plural and singular, and include corporations and partnerships, etc., that
the act, omission or failure of any officer, agent or person acting within the
scope of his authority or employment shall be deemed the act, omission or
failure of the corporation or association, and that in case of a violation by a
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partnership, association or corporation, every member of the partnership, or
association, and the directors and general officers of the corporation and the
general manager of each shall be individually liable-the members of a part-
nership were individually liable for the penalty for the act of their clerk,
a registered pharmacist, in wrongfully compounding and delivering an adul-
terated drug, although they had directed him to obey the law, and although
partnerships are not mentioned in the provision relative to the liability of
corporations and associations for the acts of their officers and agents, as the
purpose of the amendment of 1910 to Section 240 was not to limit the scope
of the act but to make it more definite and certain as to corporations and
associations. Seabury, J., dissenting.
PLEA.
Canter v. State, Ohio, 106 N. E. 656. Rejection of Plea of Guilty of Lesser
Offense and Admissibility in Evidegce. The tender of a plea of guilty of
assault and battery by the accused, upon arraignment under an indictment
charging shooting with intent to kill, which tender is rejected by the state, is
not a proper subject of record on the journal of the court. Nor is the entry
of such a plea, and its rejection by the state, admissible in evidence upon
the trial of the accused under the indictment. Wanamaker, J., dissenting.
SENTENCE.
People v. Goodrich, 149 N. Y. Supp. 406. Power to Suspend Execution.
The Supreme Court, after passing sentence of imprisonment at trial term, has
the inherent power at common law to suspend sentence during defendant's
good behavior, and to revoke such suspension at a later term and direct that
it be executed, and has the same power under Penal Law, Sec. 2188, providing
that courts in their discretion may suspend sentence during good behavior in
certain cases, in view of Code Cr. Proc., Sec. 487, as amended by Laws 1901,
Ci. 372, providing that in certain cases, where the court has ssupended sen-
tence or the execution thereof, the defendant shall be placed in the hands of a
probation officer and of Code Cr. Proc., Sec. 483, as amended by laws 1905,
Ch. 656, providing that after a plea or verdict of guilty the court, on sus-
pending sentence, may place defendant on probation or suspend sentence of
imprisonment, and, as further amended, to allow the court to revoke such
provision and pronounce judgment or revoke such suspension of judgment.
The suspension of sentence gives the prisoner no vested rights, nor does it in
any way conflict with the pardoning power of the executive.
Thompson v. Duehay, Supt. of Prisons of Department of Justice, 217 Fed.
484. Effect of Commutation on Good Time Allowance. Under Act of June
25, 1910, Ch. 387, Sec. 1, providing that every prisoner convicted of any of-
fense against the United States and confined in any United States penitentiary
or prison for a definite term or terms of over one year, whose record of con-
duct shows he has observed the rules of the institution, and who has served
one-third of the total of the term or terms for which he was sentenced, may
be released on parole, and See. 10, providing that nothing therein contained
shall impair the power of the President to grant a pardon or commutation,
or impair or revoke any good time allowance, where sentences to two four-
years' imprisonment on each of two counts, to run consecutively, were com-
muted by the President to run concurrently, the prisoner was eligible to parole
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when he had served one-third of the four-year period covered by the con-
current sentences, since the "total of the term or terms" means the total time
actually to be served, and the commutation in effect wipes out the judgment
and writes a new sentence, and, moreover, any other construction would deny
full effect to the action of the President.
VmFaxcT.
Gordon v. State, Wis., 147 N. W. 998. Error in Record. On a trial for
felony the jury found a verdict of "guilty" and the foreman orally reported
it to the court. By a mistake he had signed the blank verdict of "not guilty."
The court discovered this and directed the jury to retire. On returning into
court they again gave their verdict as "guilty." By mistake the clerk recorded
in the minutes the written verdict of "not guilty." Held that the verdict re-
turned by the jury was the legal verdict, the erroneous entry in the clerk's
minutes was without effect, and the conviction was affirmed.
Lamb v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 169 S. W. 1158. Term Fixed by Average.
A verdict that defendant was guilty of murder fixed his term of imprisonment
at thirty years. On motion to set aside the verdict, on the ground that it
was a "quotient verdict," the jurors were examined. Their testimony showed
that they had agreed upon a conviction and that the ballots cast to fix the
term ranged from five to ninety-nine years. After several ballots it was
agreed that the terms favored by each should be added and the total divided
by twelve. This was done, and the quotient was thirty-two years and six
months. A juror then moved that the term be thirty years, and the motion
was unanimously carried. One juror testified that it was agreed before the
average was taken that they should all be bound by the result, and that it
was only because of this agreement that he consented to so long a term. An-
other said in one part of his testimony that they agreed to be bound by the
result, but in another part said he was free to disagree after the average had
been found. The rest of the jurors denied any agreement to be bound by the
quotient, but said it was taken to ascertain the average opinion of the jury
and agreed to by all after the quotient had been obtained. Held that this
evidence required the trial judge to find that there was no prior agreement to
be bound by the quotient, and that a verdict so found without such prior
agreement was valid. The conviction was affirmed.
